CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: ASI

ASI Electrical Cable Trays FUNCTIONAL CRIT:

1 b

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE:

DATE: J, 12-19-97

PHASE(S): HAZARD REF:

b S.11

ANALYSTS:

J. Hicks/E. Howell

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to ET structural failure or debris source to

Orbiter from mounting bracket.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

A: Improper Manufacture

B: Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Provide support for fairing between RH SRB and RH vertical strut trays.

FMEA ITEM CODE(S)	PART NO.	PART NAME	OTY	EFFECTIVITY
4.3.94.1	80911031801-005	Mounting Bracket	2	LWT-54 & Up

			
REMARKS:			

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

SUBSYSTEM: FMEA ITEM CODE(S): Electrical Cable Trays

4.3.94.1

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

- A, B: The mounting bracket is machined from 2219-T851 aluminum alloy plate stock. Materials selected for this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501.
- A: The bracket is designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Mounting Bracket is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S054 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S517 (LWT-89 & Up).

Vendor:

B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L2 and 33L2.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, B: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911031801 and standard drawings 26L2 and 33L2).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911031801).
- A: Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911031801 and \$TP2501 Type 1, Method A).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.